Introduction
The International Space Station ("ISS"), an excellent example of multilateral space cooperation, is the largest and most complex manned space cooperative project in the human history.ermanently manned multi-use facility in low Earth orbit ("LEO") for the purpose of scientific and technological research.
1 The Partner States contribute to the construction of the ISS and share equally the benefits arising out of activities in the ISS. Various researchers have indicated the importance of the ISS in not only contributing to scientific and technological development, but also furthering the development of space laws.
signs show that China has a great chance to become part of the ISS. As such, both the ISS Partner States and China should all prepare for China's future possible participation in the ISS. Although technologically ready for possible participation, China should begin seriously considering the potential legal issues involved with such participation. The main purpose of this article is to take up this challenging task by identifying possible legal issues in China's participation in the ISS and offer suggestions for future cooperative legal framework of the Station. This paper consists of five parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will examine the possibility and significance of China's participation in the ISS. Part three will look into legal issues that may arise with China's participation in the ISS. Three legal issues are identified for analysis in this part such as legal framework, institutional, and operational issues. As far as the issue of participation in the ISS is concerned, China and Russia share similarities. Both have advanced space technologies and Russia joined the ISS only after the original framework had been in existence for several years. Examinations of Russia's participation process can offer a useful lesson for China. The discussions in Part three accordingly make reference to Russia's participation in the ISS and the changes brought to the legal regime for the ISS at that time. Part four will move further to examine issues such as democratization of the ISS legal regime, understanding of peacefulness, State responsibility, and the dispute settlement mechanism.
Significance of the China's Participation in the ISS
China has shown great interest in participating in the ISS since 2001. 9 If China participates in the ISS project, various options at different cooperative levels would exist as follows: (1) The Partner States can invite an astronaut of a non-Partner State to visit the ISS; (2) they can allow a spacecraft of a non-Partner State to dock to the ISS on a regular basis; or (3) they can go further and allow a full partnership for a non-Partner State. 10 The US has so far vetoed China's participation, 11 which,
9
Staff Writer, supra note 6. 10 D. mInDeLL et AL., the FutuRe oF humAn SPAceFLIght: objectIveS AnD PoLIcy ImPLIcAtIonS In A gLobAL context 65 (2009), available at http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/spaceFuture.pdf (last visited on Apr. 6, 2013). 11 The United States has in mind the following three possible options for China: 1. continue the non-cooperative attitude; 2. cooperative efforts step-by-step; and 3. propose a 'grand bargain,' an overall cooperative framework, including military, civil and commercial use of outer space. For details, see T. Hitchens & D. Chen, Forging a it believes, may pose "technical and safety challenges, as well as questions of technology transfer." 12 Other reasons may include China's political system, its lack of transparency, and perceived poor human rights record. Closely related to the issue of transparency, the US is also suspicious of China's policies and rules regarding technology transfer and threats of weaponization in outer space. 13 All these concerns account for China's failure to join the Missile Technology Control Regime ("MTCR").
A given State's political system and human rights regime are often barriers to space technological cooperation. However, a regular dialogue platform has been set up for the leaders of the US, the EU and China to exchange their views on human rights. Thus, the key issue rests on the concerns over 'technological transfer.' China has already established a rather complete domestic legal regime for export controls. This regime is largely in line with international standards. Internationally, China is already a member to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") and has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
14 While China has declared its intention to become a member to the MTCR and obviously enacted similar rules as the Regime, China has not yet been admitted to the MTCR. As a result, political and economic, rather than legal and technical, considerations take up a more important role. Members are taking a more pragmatic approach in admitting a new member. Possible technical or commercial benefits or any foreseeable interests from a potential membership can rule over political or human rights considerations. In this respect, China's participation in the ISS appears all the more realistic. China, as the third country to have sent a human being to outer space, holds advanced technologies for space activities; its indigenous space technologies have the potential to bring about new revolutionary developments, commercial or technical, to the operation and management of the ISS. China's efforts in developing an effective export control regime and determination to comply with the international legal regime can help to alleviate the concerns over the illegal transfer of sensitive technologies. A total exclusion of China is not beneficial to any party. Previous experience shows that excluding China from high-tech areas will not prevent China from developing advanced technologies on its own. Cooperation, instead of confrontation, would bring more practical and immediate benefits to all parties.
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The Obama administration has been actively interested in the Sino--US space cooperation. It was, however, overshadowed by the NASA appropriations bill in early May 2011. 16 This congressional prohibition shared the same concern as the minds behind the veto of China's participation in the MTCR. It was criticized as "pointless isolation gestures." 17 The effect of the ban is an open question. John
Holdren has argued that: "The ban did not apply to the President's ability to conduct foreign policy." 18 There are indications that the Obama administration and the president's appointed administrator of the NASA, Charlie Bolden, would like to get around that ban. 19 The administration planned to obey the prohibition as long as it did not conflict with the president's authority to conduct foreign relations. 20 It is in the interests of the US to cooperate with China with regards to the ISS. Allowing China to visit the ISS would "require the Chinese to build new facilities, such as a tracking station to cover the ISS orbit, and work hard at gaining experience necessary for such a rendezvous." 21 China would have to open up its program to Western experts to demonstrate its safety. 22 It is consistent with the transparency principle to be upheld in the future Inter-Governmental Agreement ("IGA"). Consequently, optimistic attitudes could be held towards China's participation in the ISS.
Legal Issues

A. Legal Framework
The ISS was originally an US program. Additionally, internal rules have been drafted to deal with astronauts' acts and general operational matters within the ISS. 31 Aside from the above three layers of documents specifically designed for the ISS, the existing space treaties and general principles of space law are still applicable to the ISS.
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Each Partner retains jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers and personnel in or on the ISS that are its nationals. It also has the opportunity to extend the application of domestic laws to the above elements and personnel. 33 Consequently, while putting forward a general legal framework for the ISS, the IGA fails to fully provide a set of homogeneous rules for specific activities carried out in the ISS. Instead, the Agreement leaves matters, such as the protection of intellectual property rights and the exchange of data and goods, to national legal regimes.
34
B. Institutional Concerns: Inferring from the Russian Experiences
In recent years, with rapid development in space technologies, China has often been presented as the competitive opponent of the US in the new race to outer space. China is the third country to have developed an independent manned space mission and has set out a clear goal of building its own space station. As the Americans and the Europeans have obviously realized that China's participation in the ISS could contribute to the development of the ISS in the future, their attitudes have been gradually changing. 35 China's possible participation in the ISS is likely to raise new legal questions that have not been directly dealt with so far. As a reference, it might be useful to consider briefly the legal issues that arose when Russia joined the ISS in the 1990s. 40 The 1998 IGA at art. 5. The basic rule is that "each Partner shall retain jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers and over personnel in or on the Space Station who are its nationals." 41 MOU art. 8.1. 42 Supra note 38, at 247. from these two Partners and the size of their crews on board the ISS. In view of US' ground control over the ISS, it is understandable that the US still retains a primary role in command and control of the ISS. 43 Criminal jurisdiction was one of the major areas for negotiation. Generally, there are four theories of international criminal jurisdiction: (1) subjective/objective territorial jurisdiction; (2) nationality jurisdiction; (3) protective jurisdiction; and (4) universal jurisdiction. 44 The 1988 IGA adopted territorial jurisdiction as the major principle, which is supplemented by the principle of nationality jurisdiction. The Partner States were to have criminal jurisdiction over their own flight elements and their own nationals. 45 However, the US enjoyed a secondary exclusive right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over "misconduct committed by a non-US national in or on a non-US element of the manned base or attached to the manned base which endangers the safety of the manned base or the crew members thereon." 46 Such a special status with regard to criminal jurisdiction again strengthened the US' controlling role in the old regime. Russia's participation led to discussions over how to balance the rights and obligations of Partner States. Furthermore, Russia needed the guarantee of jurisdiction over its own nationals. As a result, nationality jurisdiction took priority with the Partners exercising jurisdiction over their own nationals. 47 The US under the new regime could still exercise criminal jurisdiction over nationals of another Partner State, but only when the concerned Partner State failed to provide assurances of prosecution. 48 This was drastically different from the old regime where the US could exercise such jurisdiction by merely claiming that it failed to receive assurances of prosecution.
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As such, the burden of proof lay on the provider of assurances, instead of the receiver; such a shift "therefore continues the move towards fairness and equality." 50 Nationality jurisdiction is complemented by a protective principle, namely, the passive personality jurisdiction in which the Partner States shall carry out 43 provision is not to be confused with the provision on exchange of data and goods. The negotiations successfully led to the provision that all the Partner States shall make efforts to share the data and goods of their research, but special consideration shall be taken to the profits of the investors and the interests of the investing State.
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This provision, largely representing Russian Interests, on the one hand, sticks to the principle of information sharing; on the other hand, it balances the interests and benefits of the investing States and other Partner States. The arrangement is understandable since the Partners and private entities in those Partner States should be able to obtain sufficient return on their investments, instead of freely sharing their discoveries. 61 This issue is closely connected with the proper design of space commercial framework to effectively apply the term "common heritage of mankind" inscribed in the Moon Agreement.
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The IGA put down for the first time a provision regarding liability. Article 16 of the 1998 IGA deals with the application of the Liability Convention in possible liability scenarios. However, the 1998 IGA partly modifies the provision on crosswaiver of liability. Cross-waiver of liability by the Partner States is defined to be the general rule for the purpose of encouraging participation of Partner States in the exploration, and use of outer space through the ISS. 63 of liability to Ukraine, a non-Partner State. Also, the Liability Convention shall apply in any other situation, i.e., when the liability involves any third party, not belonging to Partner States and related entities. 67 The liability issue under such circumstances shall be decided on a case-by-case basis. As one scholar has correctly observed, consequently, "overall, the spirit of cooperation has resulted in the need for each partner State and their related entities to simply accept the possibility that they may suffer damage in the context of the ISS without being able to assert a liability claim for the purpose."
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C. Operational System
Russia joined the ISS at a time when it was facing economic difficulties after the end of the Cold War. This might have minimized their negotiation power leaving the leadership of the US as an integral part of the ISS. In contrast, China has now harnessed advanced space technologies and is developing its own space programs. Moreover, China's participation in the ISS shall exert substantial influence on the everyday operations of the Station. It is thus expected, in the future, a more cooperative framework stressing the equal role of all the Partners States, instead of the dominant role of the US and Russia, in the management and operation of the ISS. Optimistically, the current framework of the ISS can be more open than the 1998 framework. Eventually, China's possible participation offers an excellent opportunity to reexamine the 1998 framework and clarify or improve certain provisions that exist in the current regime. As far as China is concerned, it will be necessary to seriously study the 1998 IGA and to see if there are any necessary changes or improvements. At the same time, China should study its current situation and examine whether any preparations on its part are needed for participation in the ISS. 69 Because participation in the ISS is a venture, the costs should not outweigh the benefits. 70 Considering the huge operating and maintenance costs, and its capability to have its own control network, China will be in a position to negotiate for a better result in order to justify the costs. Cost should be proportionate to the benefits of the investment. If not, no country would be willing to be an ISS partner. Thus, China shall value highly the principle of balance of rights and obligations during the negotiations for the participation in the ISS. While China does not aspire to be a leader or to outdo the US and Russia, its contribution should be fully reflected in the management and operation of the ISS.
71
As defined in the IGA, utilization rights of the ISS come from the contribution of user elements, infrastructure elements, or both. Any Partner shall retain the use of the user elements it provides; any provider of infrastructure elements shall receive, in exchange, a fixed share of the use of certain user elements. 72 When it comes to infrastructure elements, Russia keeps 100 percent of the utilization rights in these elements. 73 Correspondingly, other Partners, vis-à-vis Russia, shall also keep 100 percent of their own elements. As such, Russia has more rights following its obligations. The MOUs provide the precise percentages of other Partners' utilization rights in Russia's elements. 74 This approach has effectively avoided the divergent views on evaluating Russia's infrastructure elements upon its participation. 75 China may adopt the same approach when China attaches its infrastructure elements to the ISS. Similarly, China shall "be responsible for the share of the common system operations costs or activities corresponding to the operation of the elements it provides," 76 and bear financial responsibilities for costs or activities arising from the If China successfully spacewalks and rendezvous, and demonstrates this latter capability multiple times, then China would have much more to offer at less risk to the United States. 80 In this regard, China's mature launching facilities and services could provide an impetus to the advancement of the ISS' transportation system. Consequently, China's possible partnership in the ISS will significantly affect the existing share of financial contributions; China's deployment of its own space shuttle may offset its share of common system operations responsibilities.
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Another matter asking urgent consideration is technical standards. Partner States provide elements, materials, and technologies for the operation of the ISS. However, different States might have different standards. If China participates in the ISS, it will need to consult with other Partner States on mutually acceptable criteria for the safety and control of relevant programs.
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Crews are essential to the daily operation of the ISS. It is necessary for China to consider the active participation of its own crews on board the ISS. It would largely depend on the accommodating capabilities of the ISS and the availability of the rescue vehicle. Furthermore, once China attaches its own infrastructure elements to the ISS, it should also consider the number of crewmembers needed for the operations and maintenance of this extra part. 
Future Considerations
When it comes to possible legal issues, the following must be taken into account. First, a more effective ISS legal regime will be necessary to further democratize the US-dominating ISS. This touches on the various administrative provisions related to management, operation, and utilization of the ISS. While the ISS is co-led by the US and Russia under the current framework, the US still takes up the leading role with the power to make many final decisions. For example, the MOUs generally article/1042/1 (last visited on Apr. 6, 2013). 80 Id. provide that the Multilateral Coordination Board ("MCB"), which is the highest-level cooperative body responsible for coordinating activities and formulating guidelines, comprises representatives from each of the Partners with the NASA as the chair.
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This arrangement partly explains the reason why the US has been able to exclude China from participating in the ISS. 85 China must decide if such managing arrangement will work for it. The question lies in how to insert China into the whole managing and operational framework of the ISS. If the ISS is essentially a cooperative venture, Chinese crew onboard the ISS should have the opportunity to freely visit any part of the ISS and use the facilities of any other Partner States for scientific research. China's role should be commensurate with the contributions it could make to the ISS. Thus, a democratic system should be amenable to all the Partner States, including China. The current provisions on criminal jurisdiction, command, and control have largely democratized the cooperative framework for the ISS Partners, and thus can continue to apply once China becomes an ISS Partner. 86 As such, China will have guaranteed criminal jurisdiction over its own national and retain jurisdiction and control over its own elements and personnel in or on board the ISS. While the US retains the overall control over the ISS due to its ground activities, China shall similarly keep control over activities carried out within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to overall coordination for the ISS operations. As mentioned above, the extradition provision is meaningful to China. However, one simple paragraph on the issue is obviously too vague and general when real problems come up. In this aspect, it would be advisable to refer to the Code of Conduct for ISS Crews concerning the understanding of misconduct or crimes in specific circumstance of outer space. 87 Unfortunately, even under the Code of Conduct, the Partner States have had difficulties in reaching consensus on certain terms. Because the States had failed to define the legal concept of 'harassment,' e.g., a general statement was inserted in the Code of Conduct in the end. 88 It merely ISS Crew Members' conduct shall be such as to maintain a harmonious and cohesive relationship among the ISS Crew Members and an appropriate level of mutual confidence and respect through an interactive, participative and relationship-oriented approach which duly takes into account the international and multicultural nature of the crew and mission.
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It would thus necessary to continue the work of trying to come up with clear applicable scope for the extradition provision. Second, it is important to reach mutual understanding on the term 'peaceful purposes' in the IGA. 90 Currently, there is no clear definition yet; it can be taken to mean and encompass a range of terms such as non-military, civil use and non-aggressiveness. 91 This might create problems in view of the US' suspicion over China's motives in developing its space programs. 92 In order to avoid misunderstanding, it would be necessary for both parties to reach some consensus on the term 'peaceful purposes.' Although it has been discussed in the international arena for many years, no consensus has been reached yet. Thus, a pragmatic approach is required to adopt. 'Transparency' would be an important principle to dissipate suspicions over peaceful use of outer space. 93 A stable mechanism could be to set up periodic meetings for Partner States to exchange views and discuss issues of common concerns. The successful functioning of the ISS relies on mutual trust. Dialogues can help build trust and strengthen cooperation among Partner States.
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The transparency principle should also apply to the provision and exchange of data and materials. Some basic rules have been provided in the IGA 1998. Further research is needed on how to add transparency to the application of those data and materials. This includes the issue of intellectual property protection and fair use of the materials. The EU has largely unified the intellectual property regime. It would be thus necessary to look into the regime at the international level and make sure that inventions in the ISS should be protected in most jurisdictions around the world. All existing international intellectual property treaties such as the 1883 Paris Fourth, closely connected with issue of vague language in the IGA, a possible body should serve as a neutral party to resolve such disagreements or disputes with regards to interpretation. Ensuring continued cooperation among Partner States should be the most important guideline for the dispute settlement mechanism. As such, a committee could be set up comprising of senior representatives or officials designated by the Partner States. Aside from trying to resolve disputes and make decisions by consensus, the Committee can also be designated to carry out functions such as the supervision of the implementation of the IGA provisions; interpreting the IGA provisions; and drafting proposals to amend the IGA. 98 A corollary from the above is that there should be a binding dispute settlement mechanism, possibly with a third neutral party granted authority to finally settle issues. Dispute settlement was one of the most contentious issues during the 1985-1988 negotiations on the ISS project. 99 The US insisted that because of the sheer magnitude of the project and the enormous economic investment involved, it was in the parties' interests to settle their disputes at the lowest possible hierarchical level. 100 Without third-party dispute settlement, two major adverse consequences would arise. 101 One is the stagnation of the implementation of intergovernmental commitments. 102 The other is the perpetration of legal uncertainty among private operators seeking to transact business in an unsettled legal environment. 103 While friendly consultation provides an amicable way to resolve possible disputes and helps maintain a good relationship among the Partner States, 104 the possibility of larger disputes should not be ignored. Thus, specific rules and dispute resolution system will determine how to resolve such disputes. At the moment, a binding arbitration mechanism would be useful to the ultimate resolution of disputes. While allowing some flexibility in the dispute resolution process, the parties concerned will be obliged to comply with any decision made by the arbitral body. This shall be helpful to the sustainable development for the cooperation among Partner States. 105 Last, but not least, in view of the "One Country, Two System" 106 arrangement in China, policymakers will also consider the feasibility of applying Hong Kong and Macau laws in certain space modules registered by Hong Kong or Macau. 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the legal issues which may arise with the China's participation in the ISS in the future. The ISS is the first permanently inhabited outpost in outer space. A team of rotating international crew carries out commercial, scientific and technological research onboard the ISS.
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The ISS provides an ideal example of space commercialization. Having few clear rules in place to regulate space commercial activities, China's participation in the ISS shall hopefully provide an impetus for an in-depth study of the legal issues involved in space commercialization. The legal issues should be considered from at least three perspectives: legal framework, institutional, and operational issue. For the discussions on the above legal issues, Russian participation in the ISS in 1998 can be referred to. On the whole, we should uphold the principle of balancing rights and obligations in China's participation.
China's participation in the ISS also provides an excellent opportunity for both China and the ISS Partner States to carry out international space cooperation at a large scale and at a higher level. Before its participation, however, China should prepare for all possible technical and legal problems, especially when the current Partner States still hold suspicions over China's participation. China should start seriously considering why these countries hold such suspicions and how China can dissipate these suspicions. Moreover, China should more proactively examine the existing ISS documents and study how to further improve the current IGA and improve the ISS cooperative framework. As a result, China shall move ahead in two-stage processes: first on the possibility of participation; second on the modification and improvement of the current ISS regime. These two-stage processes are inter-related; China's participation shall largely rely on how the future ISS regime can benefit China and fit in China's further development in space technologies and programs. In turn, China's participation shall unavoidably lead to work on revising and improving the current regime. Thus, these two-stage processes should be considered concurrently. Also, China must prepare for both processes and move forward for possible negotiations with the Partner States.
On the one hand, China's participation shall contribute the sustainable development of the ISS. The ISS can make use of "the expertise and potential of the China's space program and Chinese financial support."
111 As one of the major space powers, China's participation will take the ISS one step further towards a real multi-national cooperative projects in the peaceful and commercial use of outer space. China, on the other hand, should grasp the best opportunity to start negotiations and learn from the rich experience of the ISS Partner States. By expanding the scope and deepening the level of international space cooperation, China shall establish solid foundation for its own space station in the future and realizing more colorful dreams towards conquering outer space.
